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Municipal Corporations
Ardath A. Hamann*
Municipal corporations law is very diverse. This article is divided

into five major areas: zoning, annexation, home rule, tort immunity,
and employee discharge and addresses Illinois decisions during the
period of November 1, 1986, until December 30, 1987.1 Only four
of these cases were decided by the Illinois Supreme Court; three of

them involved home rule.
I.

ZONING

In the area of zoning, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the use
of zoning to restrict the location of "adult" businesses. The Second
District addressed the question of a municipality's ability to limit
zoning changes by an adjacent municipality. The Fourth District
decided a question that also involved home rule issues: the effect of

the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act on zoning for signs
along highways.
A.

Zoning for "Adult" Uses

In 1977, Cook County enacted a zoning ordinance that required
operators of adult businesses to obtain special use permits and locate
*

B.S. 1974, Purdue University; J.D. 1977, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of

William and Mary; LL.M. 1986, The John Marshall Law School; Assistant Professor of Law,
The John Marshall Law School. Professor Hamann was formerly an Assistant Illinois Attorney
General in the Antitrust Division. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of her
research assistant, Michael Bersani, in the preparation of this article.
1. Four cases decided in February and March of 1988 were also included. The Illinois
Supreme Court decisions in County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore, and City
of Decatur v. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local
268, were included because the appellate court opinions which the supreme court reversed were
decided in November, 1986. See County of Cook infra note 5 and accompanying text and City
of Decatur infra note 91 and accompanying text. People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland
Park was included because it was originally decided by the Illinois Supreme Court on November
20, 1986. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. National Advertising Co. v. Downers
Grove was included because it relied on Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Zion,
157 Il.App. 3d 461, 510 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 116 I11.
2d 552, 515 N.E.2d
105 (1987), which is discussed at length in this article. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
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only in certain commercially zoned areas. 2 After the First District
held the 1977 ordinance unconstitutional as a prior restraint on
protected speech,3 the Cook County Board adopted an amendment
to the ordinance which allowed adult uses as permitted uses in 78
industrially zoned areas 4 and as special uses in 245 commercially
zoned areas5 so long as the adult uses were not within 1,000 feet of
each other in the commercial areas. 6 Neither the original ordinance
nor the amendment contained a grandfather clause.
In 1983, Cook County sued to obtain an injunction against the
defendant businesses which had not complied with the ordinance.
The trial court enjoined the defendants from operating in their current
locations, holding that the zoning ordinance was constitutional.
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District reversed and held the
statute unconstitutional in County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade
and Bookstore.7 The court relied on the United States Supreme Court
decision of Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,' which held
unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment.
The appellate court reasoned that while the Cook County ordinance
does not ban adult businesses, it requires relocation to undesirable
areas. "[T]here is no significant difference, for first amendment
purposes, between driving lawful speech beyond the municipal borders and forcing it to an undesirable location." 9 Relegating adult

2. The zoning ordinance classification was C-3. Cook County, IL., Zoning Ordinance
§ 13.16 (1977).
3. County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 98 11. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d
1173 (1st Dist. 1981).
4. County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore, 150 I11.
App. 3d 6, 10, 501
N.E.2d 133, 136 (Ist Dist. 1986). These areas were zoned 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4.
5. 150 I11.
App. 3d at 10, 501 N.E.2d at 136. These areas were zoned C-3, C-4, C-6,
and C-8.
6. Cook County, IL., Zoning Ordinance, art 13, § 6 provides in part:
There are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as
having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of
them are concentrated under certain circumstances, thereby having a deleterious
effect upon the adjacent and nearby residential and commercial areas where nurseries,
schools, nursing homes, churches and similar uses are located. . . . To prevent
concentration of such uses from having an adverse effect upon the adjacent and
nearby residential and commercial areas above referred to, such uses are hereby
established as permitted uses in all the 78 industrially zoned areas of 1-2, 1-3, and
1-4 and as special uses in all the 245 commercially zoned areas of C-3, C-4, C-6,
and C-8. To prevent such uses from having an adverse effect upon adjacent areas
in the C-3, C-4, C-6, and C-8 commercial zones, not more than two such uses shall
be established within one thousand feet of each other. (quoted in 150 I11.
App. 3d
at 10, 501 N.E.2d at 136.)
7. 150 I11.
App. 3d 6, 501 N.E.2d 133 (1st Dist. 1986).
8. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
9. County of Cook, 150 Il1. App. 3d at 17, 501 N.E.2d at 141.

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1046 1987-1988

1988]

Municipal Corporations

businesses to industrial zones that are undeveloped by commercial
enterprises, largely inaccessible to the public and without access to
water, sewers and utilities has the practical effect of denying them
the opportunity to operate.
In March of 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the First District and held that the Cook County Ordinance was constitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the
statute under the standard in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., ° instead of Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim." The Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that because Cook County did not attempt
to ban adult businesses, and did "not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication" the ordinance was not unconstitutional. 2
The court briefly reasoned that the ordinance was also content neutral
and served the substantial governmental interests of preventing crime
and preserving real estate values.
The court then detailed the expert testimony presented by the
plaintiff and defendants at trial. It noted that there was a wide
diversity of sites in the industrially zoned areas that varied in size,
price, location and availability. The court concluded that "Renton
does not require the county to provide the defendants with land
tailor-made to conform to the defendant's requirements. . . . Even
though the defendants may have to expend a certain amount of
money to relocate, the defendants 'are affected no differently from
any other commercial enterprise that suffers economic detriment as
'
a result of land use regulation."" 1

3

Next, the court concluded that failure to include a grandfather
clause did not render the statute unconstitutional. The court noted
that while both Young and Renton only applied to new businesses,
subsequent state and federal decisions have upheld ordinances similar
to Cook County's so long as there was a reasonable period for
amortization. The court concluded that a one year period14 for

amortization was reasonable."

10. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Renton ordinance prohibited any adult use within 1,000 feet
of churches, schools or homes. The result was that adult uses were limited to approximately
5% of the city.
11. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
12. County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore, 122 Il.2d 123, 133, 522
N.E.2d 73, 77 (1988) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 47).
13. Id. at 139, 522 N.E.2d at 79 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 78 (1976)).
14. The ordinance provided for an initial period of six months and an automatic six
month renewal upon application.
15. The court held that there was a presumption of validity for such provisions, and
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Finally, the defendants had argued that the requirement of
special use permits for location in commercially zoned areas rendered
the ordinance unconstitutional. The court reasoned that because
county officials had complete discretion in issuing special use permits,
this provision unconstitutionally allowed them to discriminate based
on content. 6 However, the court severed this provision from the
remainder of the ordinance because the remainder of the ordinance
could withstand constitutional scrutiny independent of the severed
portion.
B.

Zoning by Adjacent Municipalities

The Second District in Village of Riverwoods v. Village of
Buffalo Grove7 decided the limits of a municipality's ability to
contest rezoning within another municipality's borders. Buffalo Grove,
by ordinance, approved development of two 12-story office buildings
for a 17.6 acre parcel located within its corporate limits. Riverwoods,
which is separated from this parcel by a forest preserve and a river,
challenged the ordinance.
The court held that the plaintiff had no standing because Riverwoods' primary concern was increased traffic. The court reasoned
that only when a municipality is directly injured in its corporate
capacity, does it have standing to contest the rezoning of property
within the corporate limits of another municipality. 8 For example,
a decrease in tax revenues resulting from a decrease in assessed
valuation of property, an increase in costs for police protection, 9
and costs resulting from a legal obligation to supply sewers and
water to the property 20 are injuries which give rise to standing.
However, since traffic congestion was already a serious problem in
the area, the incremental effect of the construction would be minimal.

15. The court held that there was a presumption of validity for such provisions, and
since the defendants had presented no evidence of financial injury, they could not rebut the
presumption.
16. Renaissance Arcade, 122 I1. 2d at 151, 522 N.E.2d at 85. This conclusion appears
to be consistent with the First District's decision on the 1977 ordinance. See World Wide News
Agency, 98 111. App. 3d at 1099, 424 N.E.2d at 1178.
17. 159 11. App. 3d 208, 511 N.E.2d 184 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Il. 2d 575, 515
N.E.2d 128 (1987).
18. Id. at 212, 511 N.E.2d at 186.
19. Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill. 2d 392, 398, 410
N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
20. City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview, 67 I1. 2d 399, 367 N.E.2d 1305
(1977).
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Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence of other potential
injury was speculative at best and held that Riverwoods had no
standing to contest the rezoning.
On the surface this case is difficult to reconcile with the Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of
Hoffman Estates.21 In that case, Hoffman Estates attempted to rezone
residential property for business uses, specifically a large open air
theater. 22 The court held that Barrington Hills had standing to
challenge the zoning change because of increased costs due to traffic
congestion and decreased revenues due to lower property values.2 3
These were the same allegations as those in Village of Riverwoods;
the evidence presented in both courts was also similar. However, the
Second District characterized the plaintiff's evidence as "generalized
and speculative. ' ' 24 Moreover, it noted that because traffic in the
area was "[allready heavy, and expected to increase even if the site
remains undeveloped, any impact by the development upon River'
woods municipal expenditures is de minimus.

25

There may have been an unarticulated reason for distinguishing
Village of Barrington Hills. While Riverwoods was attempting to
prevent Buffalo Grove from increasing its commercial uses, Riverwoods already was the site of the Commerce Clearing House headquarters and Riverwoods had approved the development of another
corporate headquarters. 26 While the development at issue was substantially larger than others in either municipality, the court may
have believed that it was unreasonable for Riverwoods to contest
new commercial development in a neighboring municipality that was
consistent with previous development within its own borders.
C. Zoning Limits on Advertising Along Federal-Aid Highways
The issues of the final zoning case overlap with home rule
questions. In Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Zion,27
the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment allowing him to construct
an advertising sign twice as large as was allowed by the Mt. Zion

21. 81 Ill. 2d 392, 410 N.E.2d 37 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
22. It is now known as Poplar Creek Music Theater.
23. Village of Barrington Hills, 81 111. 2d at 398, 410 N.E.2d at 40.
24. Village of Riverwoods, 159 Il. App. 3d at 212, 511 N.E.2d at 186.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 210, 511 N.E.2d at 185.
27. 157 Ill. App. 3d 461, 510 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Il. 2d 552, 515
N.E.2d 105 (1987).
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ordinance. The sign would have been located along a federally funded
highway which bisects the village. The court stated that it was faced
with an issue of first impression: 21 whether the Illinois Highway
Advertising Control Act 29 preempts municipal zoning powers.
The Fourth District noted that two sections of the Highway
Advertising Act conflicted. The act was originally passed to prevent
the loss of federal highway funds after the federal Highway Beautification Act of 196530 was enacted. Section 1 of the Illinois statute
provides in part, "[o]utdoor advertising is a legitimate, commercial
use of private property adjacent to roads and highways; . . . outdoor

advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing function,
and an established segment of the national economy which serves to
promote and protect private investments in commerce and industry
and should be allowed to operate in business areas . . . ."I' The
language in section 1 was obviously included to protect the interests
32
of the advertisers.
The purpose of section 7 on the other hand was to protect
municipalities that wished to further limit advertising along highways.33 Section 7 provides: "In zoned commercial and industrial
areas, whenever a State, county or municipal zoning authority has
adopted laws or ordinances, which include regulations with respect
to the size, lighting and spacing of signs . . . the provisions of section
6 [which sets forth the maximum limitations on advertising] shall not
' 3' 4
apply to the erection of signs in such areas.

28. While this case was one of first impression in state courts in Illinois, a similar issue
was decided by the Third District and the same issue was decided by the Seventh Circuit.
In Dolson Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Macomb, 46 III. App. 3d 116, 121, 360 N.E.2d
805, 809 (3d Dist. 1977), the Third District held that a city ordinance which prohibited offpremise signs from areas zoned for business uses conflicted with the Highway Advertising Act.
The Seventh Circuit, in the context of a civil rights action, did hold that the act preempted
municipal zoning regulation of advertising signs along highways. National Advertising Co. v.
City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1986). The court in Dingeman dismissed this
decision because of the "absence of adequate briefing of the preemption issue." 157 I11.App.
3d at 464, 510 N.E.2d at 541. This may be a misreading of the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
The Seventh Circuit discussed at length its attempts to understand counsel's argument and
concluded that plaintiff's counsel had incorrectly framed the issue. The court then "called for
briefs on the statutory issue." 789 F.2d at 574. Nowhere was there any indication that the
preemption issue had not been adequately briefed.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121,
501-16 (1985).
30. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1982).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121,
501 (1985).
32. 157 II1. App. 3d at 464, 510 N.E.2d at 541.
33. Id.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121,
507 (1985).
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The legislature did not indicate whose interests should predominate: advertisers or municipalities. However, the court held that
because one of the purposes in section 1 was "to preserve natural
beauty and to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display
could regulate advertising signs
of such signs. . ."3, municipalities
"consistent with customary use." '3 6

The court never discussed two other reasons which would require
the same result.3 7 First, if the court held, as the plaintiff argued,
that a municipality cannot enact limitations that are more stringent
than the state limits in the Highway Advertising Act,3" the language
in section 7 of the Act, "whenever a State, county or municipal
zoning authority has adopted laws or ordinances. . ." would become
meaningless. Second, the plaintiff's interpretation would also render

meaningless the phrase in section 7, "the provisions of Section 6
shall not apply." 3 9

501 (1985).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121,
36. 157 111.App. 3d at 465, 510 N.E.2d at 541. The court never defined the term
"customary use." The term is used in both sections 1 and 7 of the statute. The court discussed,
without deciding, varying interpretations of the term. Id. at 463, 510 N.E.2d at 540. Its only
conclusion was that "[A] conflict definitely exists within the Act." Id. The court then essentially
made its decision on policy grounds.
37. The court also did not discuss Dolson Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Macomb,
46 111.App. 3d 116, 360 N.E.2d 805 (3d Dist. 1977), in detail; it merely noted that the holding
was limited to prohibitions on advertising signs. While the characterization of the Dolson
decision was accurate, two points were raised in that case which are relevant to the decision
in Dingeman.
The Third District in Dolson analyzed the legislative history of the Illinois statute. Id. at
119, 360 N.E.2d at 807. Two sections which would have required signs to comply with local
zoning ordinances were deleted, and the language "customary use" was substituted prior to
enactment. In addition, the court also referred to Section 14.01 of the act, which provides
that the Department may establish rules for the purpose of implementing the act, but it may
not "add to, or increase the severity of the regulatory standards set forth in Section 6 of the
514.01 (1985). Based
Act." Id. at 120-21, 360 N.E. 2d at 808; See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121,
on these two points, the court concluded that a non home rule municipality could not ban
advertising adjacent to federally funded highways. Dolson, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 121, 360 N.E.2d
at 808.
The Dolson analysis would not change the result in Dingeman. The decision in Dingeman
was based on the fact that the language in certain sections of the statute conflicted with the
language in other sections. The legislative history does not reconcile those provisions; it only
points out the scope of the dispute between the business and environmental lobbies at the time
the legislation was enacted.
38. Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65, 510 N.E.2d at 541. The relevant provisions
of the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 are in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121
506-506.04 (1985).
39. The Seventh Circuit addressed this argument in National Advertising Company v.
City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1986). The court suggested that municipalities
could regulate the style of the sign or the total height of the structure (by regulating the height
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More recently, the Second District relied on Dingeman in two
cases against Downers Grove which were consolidated as National
Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove. 4° Downers Grove, a
home rule municipality, enacted an ordinance that limited the size
and location of signs. Plaintiffs sought to construct signs, larger than
those permitted by ordinance, adjacent to a federally funded highway.
The court briefly discussed the three cases construing the Illinois
41
statute and decided to follow the decision in Dingeman.

II. ANNEXATION
One of the controversial issues in the annexation area remains
the contiguity requirement. In three cases, all in the Second District,
the appellate court considered contiguity questions.
In People ex rel Ryan v. Village of Bartlett,42 the court construed
an exception to the requirement that property to be annexed be
contiguous to the municipality. The exception provides that "[tierritory
which is not contiguous to a municipality but is separated therefrom
only by a forest preserve district may be annexed to the municipality ....,,41
The plaintiff argued that there was property other than
the forest preserve which separated the property from the city;
therefore the territory was not separated from the city "only" by
the forest preserve. The appellate court properly rejected the argument because under that interpretation, the only property that could
be annexed under this statutory exception would be an island completely surrounded by a forest preserve."

of the base). While this analysis may be technically correct, it is overly narrow. Most
municipalities (and for that matter the federal government by enacting the highway beautification bill) are much more concerned with the size of signs than their style.
The court also suggested that the legislature was allowing regulation of signs more than
660 feet from the road or in areas zoned residential or for farming. However, that analysis
begs the question. The Illinois statute does not attempt to regulate signs in those situations,
so there would be no need to create the exception in section 7 for such regulation.
40. Nos. 2-87-0184 and 2-87-0184 (11. App. Feb. 9, 1988) (available March 19, 1988, on
LEXIS, State library, Dist. file).
41. The court distinguished Dolson Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Macomb on the
basis that Macomb, unlike Downers Grove, was not a home rule municipality. The court also
refused to follow the Seventh Circuit decision in National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling
Meadows which did involve a home rule municipality. However, the court did not analyze the
Seventh Circuit decision which discussed at length whether home rule regulation was preempted
by the state statute.
42. 151 II1. App. 3d 533, 502 N.E.2d 443 (2d Dist. 1986).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-1 (1985).
44. 151 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 502 N.E.2d at 446.
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In People ex rel First National Bank of Chicago v. City of

North Chicago,' 5 the plaintiffs sought to have two annexations declared invalid. 46 In 1977, North Chicago annexed a parcel that
included a roadway strip that extended beyond the city's border. In

1982, North Chicago annexed a triangular parcel that was bordered
on side one by the 1977 roadway annexation, on side two by North
Chicago and on side three by Waukegan. North Chicago annexed

the property pursuant to a section that allows the annexation of
unincorporated property that is wholly surrounded by one or more
municipalities.47
The court noted that in 1977, the property owners did not have
the "special interest" required for standing to challenge the annexation because they did not own the annexed property and the
annexation did not affect their property. However, when North
Chicago annexed the plaintiffs' property in 1982, they did acquire
standing to contest not only the 1982 annexation but also the 1977

annexation on which it was based.
The contiguity question arose in the context of the statute of
limitations. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were barred
from challenging the 1977 annexation by the one year statute of

limitations. 48 There is an exception to the one year limitations period
if the annexed territory "was not contiguous at the time of the

annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to
contest such annexation.

' 49

The 1981 amendment to the statute added

the second requirement that allows the noncontiguity to be cor-

45. 158 I11.
App. 3d 85, 510 N.E.2d 577 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116 111.2d 574, 515
N.E.2d 124 (1987).
46. As noted in the opinion, this was the second appeal in this case. City of North
Chicago, 158 I11.
App. 3d at 89, 510 N.E.2d at 579. In an unpublished decision in 1984, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Lake County and held that the
plaintiffs should have been allowed to file their quo warranto complaint. Id.
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-13 (1985) provides in part:
Whenever any unincorporated territory containing 60 acres or less is wholly bounded
by (a) one or more municipalities, . . . that territory may be annexed by any
municipality by which it is bounded in whole or in part, by the passage of an
ordinance to that effect after notice is given as provided in this Section.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-46 (1985) provides in part:
[No person] shall commence an action contesting either directly or indirectly the
annexation of any territory to a municipality unless initiated within one year after
the date such annexation becomes final .. .except that the limitation of this Section
shall not apply to annexations of territory which was not contiguous at the time of
annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest such
annexation.
49. Id.
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rected.5 0 North Chicago's 1982 annexation of the triangular parcel
did not, however, cure the noncontiguity of the 1977 strip annexation.
The 1982 parcel had already been annexed by Waukegan and was
the subject of a quo warranto proceeding at the time of the North
Chicago annexation; therefore, the 1982 parcel was not unincorporated as required by statute." Consequently, the 1977 annexation was
subject to attack.
If Waukegan had not annexed the 1982 parcel before North
Chicago tried to annex it, the court would apparently have allowed
North Chicago to bootstrap its 1977 strip annexation. The plaintiff
had alleged that the 1982 annexation was invalid because the 1977
annexation was invalid. However, the court did not rule independently on the 1977 annexation. The court ruled that because the 1982
annexation was invalid for other reasons, the 1977 strip annexation
had not been cured and thus was invalid.12 If this sounds confusing,
it is.
The second provision of the statute of limitations section should
protect a strip annexation only if a subsequent legal annexation
makes the strip annexation contiguous. For example, if North Chicago had annexed the triangular property with the consent of the
landowners, the 1977 strip annexation would have become immune
to attack by landowners in subsequent cases. However, the 1977 strip
annexation by North Chicago was used as the method of annexing
the 1982 triangular parcel which would then have ratified the 1977
strip annexation. Thus the court's construction is not a logical
interpretation of the exception to the statute of limitations.
In People ex rel Village of Long Grove v. Village of Buffalo
Grove,53 Buffalo Grove attempted to annex a 95 acre parcel based
on a six hundred foot common boundary. The parcel was bounded
on three and a half of its four sides by Long Grove. The court
focused on the statutory definition of contiguous, specifically the
legislature's rejection of strip, corridor and cornering annexations.
The Second District held that taking into consideration the size of
the parcel in proportion to the common boundary, the parcel was
4
not, as a matter of law, contiguous to Buffalo Grove.

50. Amended by P.A. 82-211, § 1 (eff. Aug. 14, 1981).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-13 (1985).
52. City of North Chicago, 158 111.
App. 3d at 109, 510 N.E.2d at 593.
53. 160 I11.App. 3d 455, 513 N.E.2d 408 (2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 118 Ill. 2d 551,
520 N.E.2d 392 (1988).
54. Id. at 462, 513 N.E.2d at 413.
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Several procedural questions were also decided in this case. First
the court held that a municipality must record the annexation ordinance for the annexation to become effective." Second, there was
no de facto annexation of the property because the property was not
used or improved by the city; in fact, the property was vacant and
unused.16 Finally, Buffalo Grove's attempted annexation included
half of the right of ways of two streets bordering the property. Long
Grove contended that those streets were within its corporate borders.
Zoning maps of both parties to this action showed those streets as
within Long Grove. Consequently, the Second District held that
Buffalo Grove did not meet its burden of proving that all the property
was unincorporated. The court noted that on that basis alone the
7
approval of the annexation must be reversed.1
In In re Petition of Village of Long Grove to Annex Certain
Territory,"' the court held that an annexation petition lost its priority
over another municipality which was attempting to annex the same
property because six years had elapsed between the filing of the
petition before the court and any substantive action; twenty-six
continuances were obtained during that period. When more than one
municipality file annexation petitions concurrently, the court cannot
consider them simultaneously; they must be heard consecutively. In
this case, another municipality had filed a petition six months before
Long Grove's petition. However, the fact that the other municipality's
annexation petition was pending during much of the six year period
did not relieve Long Grove of its responsibility for taking affirmative
acts on its own petition. The court noted first that the earlier
annexation petition was defective on its face; second, Long Grove
probably knew from press and other sources that the other municipality was not pursuing its annexation; and finally, the other municipality's failure to act allowed Long Grove to conclude that the
other municipality had abandoned its action. Therefore, Long Grove
had a duty to actively pursue its annexation petition. 9
While the result in this case is probably correct, the court should
not h ve imputed notice to Long Grove of the other municipality's

55. Id: at 458, 513 N.E.2d at 410; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-9 (1985) provides that
when a municipality annexes property that it owns, it must record the relevant ordinance.
56. Village of Long Grove, 160 I11.App. 3d. at 459, 513 N.E.2d at 411.
57. Id. at 461, 513 N.E.2d at 412.
58. 156 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1060-61, 509 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116
I11.2d 558, 515 N.E.2d 128 (1987).
59. Id. at 1062-63, 509 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
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abandonment of its claim. While municipalities often know what
neighboring municipalities are doing, this does not constitute notice.
The court's finding that the first municipality's petition was defective
on its face was sufficient to support its decision, and the court should
not have speculated on the question of actual knowledge.
In In re Petition of the Village of Kildeer to Annex Certain
Property,6° the village filed three annexation petitions before three
separate judges. All three judges approved the petitions and author-

ized referenda for the next election. Together the annexations created
a hollow quadrilateral with the apparent purpose of preventing any
annexation of the surrounded territory. 61 The property owners filed
motions to vacate the orders because they did not learn of the

proposed annexation until four months after the judges had approved
the petitions.62 The thrust of Kildeer's argument was that the time
provided by statute for objections had past, and therefore, the trial
courts could not vacate their prior orders.
The Second District held that even though Kildeer had technically
complied with all the requirements of the municipal code, it would
6
allow the motion to vacate because substantial fraud was involved.
The city had divided the property into three segments to avoid

application of statutory limits on annexation. 6' At several points in
the opinion, the court noted that there was no question that the
attempted annexation was illegal. Moreover, notice of the proposed

60. 162 Ill. App. 3d 262, 514 N.E.2d 1020 (2d Dist. '1987), appeal granted, No. 66205
(Ill. Feb. 3, 1988).
61. In July, 1986, the Village of Lake Zurich adopted an annexation ordinance which
overlapped some of the property at issue in this case. In December, after the trial court
decision but before the appellate court decision, the Village of Kildeer filed a quo warranto
action challenging the Village of Lake Zurich's annexation ordinance. On cross motions for
summary judgment, the circuit court entered judgment for Kildeer because Kildeer's annexation
ordinances had priority because they had not been defeated in the collateral action. The Second
District reversed and held that in a quo warranto proceeding, Lake Zurich had a right to
attack the validity of Kildeer's annexation ordinances. The court then remanded the case for
a complete determination of the issues. Village of Kildeer v. Village of Lake Zurich, No. 287-0646 (2d Dist. April 7, 1988) (available on WESTLAW, IL-CS Database). Although this
decision is on Westlaw, it has not yet been released and is therefore subject to revision or
withdrawal.
62. Petition of Kildeer, 162 I11. App. 3d at 266, 514 N.E.2d at 1023; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, 2-1401 (1985) allows relief from final orders and judgments in situations where the
trial court was not aware of facts that would have changed the court's decision.
63. Petition of Kildeer, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 514 N.E.2d at 1030-31.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 1 7-1-2 (1985) provides that, absent a few exceptions not
applicable to the facts in Petition of Kildeer, no more than 10 acres can be carved from any
parcel for annexation without the owner's consent.
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annexation was published in the Chicago Sun-Times, not the local
newspaper as had been the past practice. Finally, even after the
objectors discovered the annexation attempt, Kildeer refused to provide them with maps and other documents. Thus, the court refused
to allow the municipality to use procedural devices to block enforcement of statutory requirements, particularly when there was evidence
of bad faith on the part of the municipality.
III.

HOME RULE

The Illinois Supreme Court decided perhaps the most important
municipal corporation case this year in the home rule area. The
primary issue in People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park5
was whether a home rule unit must comply with the Illinois Prevailing
66
Wage Act.
In 1983, the City of Highland Park, a home rule municipality,
issued contract specifications for a water treatment project that did
not require contractors to comply with the Prevailing Wage Act. The
Illinois Department of Labor sought an injunction preventing the
awarding of the contract. The Circuit Court of Lake County dismissed the action, and the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District affirmed. 67 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on November
20, 1986.68 The court then granted plaintiff's petition for a rehearing. 69 In February, 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its
70
previous decision.
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 created home rule municipalities
and gave them the power to "perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs. . .. ",71 The powers granted to home rule
65. 135 Il.App. 3d 580, 482 N.E.2d 114 (2d Dist. 1985), rev'd, 121 Il1.
2d 1, 520 N.E.2d
316 (1988).
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, J 39s-1-39s-12 (1985).
67.

Bernardi, 135 Ill.
App. 3d at 581, 584, 482 N.E.2d at 115, 117.

68. No. 62419 (Il.Nov. 20, 1986) (Westlaw).
69. In the interim, Justice Goldenhersh of the Fifth District retired and Justice Cunningham was appointed in his place.
70. People ex rel Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 121 Ill. 2d 1, 520 N.E.2d 316
(1988). The court first
held that the case was not moot even though the defendant's public
works project had already been completed. Id. at 6-8, 520 N.E.2d at 318-19.
71.

ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). The fulltext of this section is as follows:

A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county
and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule
units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units.
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
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municipalities only allow the municipalities to exercise their powers
to address local problems. 72 A municipality cannot exercise powers

when the problem is of a statewide nature or is one that is tradi73
tionally addressed by state government.
The Prevailing Wage Act requires that workers on all public
works projects paid for in whole or in part with public funds 74 be
paid "no less than the general prevailing hourly rate as paid for
work of a similar character in the locality. . . ."7 The public body
must ascertain the prevailing wage and include it as a specification
76
in the contract.

The home rule question is whether the provisions of the Pre-

vailing Wage Act concern matters that are primarily local or statewide. 77 The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Simon, held that a home rule municipality was bound by the Pre-

vailing Wage Act for two reasons. First, "[d]eparture

from the

prevailing wage . . directly affects matters and individuals outside
the territorial boundaries of Highland Park." 78 The prevailing wage
in a locality is determined by computations using only the wages
paid on public works projects in the area. 79 Consequently, the prevailing wage throughout Lake County would become depressed and
income of workers would decrease if Highland Park were allowed to
refuse to comply with the Prevailing Wage Act. Second, the Prevailing Wage Act is legislation in an area traditionally regulated by

the state. The court enumerated many state statutes in the labor area
including child labor legislation,80 workmen's compensation legislation8'

72. See City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.,
436 (1976). The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that noise
concern and held that the power to regulate noise pollution
tutional home rule power.
73. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 I11.2d
74.

65 I11.2d 1, 7, 357 N.E.2d 433,
pollution is a matter of statewide
emissions was not within consti483, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 39s-2 (1985).

75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 1 39s-1 (1985). The full text of this section provides:
It is the policy of the State of Illinois that a wage of no less than the general
prevailing hourly rate as paid for work of a similar character in the locality in which
the work is performed, shall be paid to all laborers, workers and mechanics employed
by or on behalf of any and all public bodies engaged in public works.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 11 39s-4, 39s-9 (1985).
77. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 11 39s-l-39s-12 (1985). The Prevailing Wage Act does
not include a provision that preempts action by a home rule unit. Id.
78. People ex rel Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 121 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 520 N.E.2d 316,
321 (1988).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 39s-2 (1985).
80.
81.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 31.1-31.22 (1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
138.1-138.30 (1985).
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and legislation abolishing wage discrimination.82 The Prevailing Wage
Act promotes a favorable labor climate by both mitigating "against
an impoverished work force and 'support[ing] the integrity of the
collective bargaining process by preventing the undercutting of employee wages in the private construction sector."' 83 Justice Simon
then noted that allowing home rule units to legislate
in this area
'8 4
would "put at risk all of the State's labor laws."

In dissent, Justice Miller focused on the legislature's failure in
the Prevailing Wage Act, to specifically preempt action by home rule
municipalities. The Constitution provides two methods for limiting
the exercise of home rule authority: the legislature by three fifths
vote may limit a unit's exercise of a power; and the legislature may,
by statute, specifically allow only the state to exercise a power.85 In
the absence of the exercise of these powers by the state, a home rule
unit may exercise its powers concurrently with the state.8 6 Because
the legislature did not specifically prohibit home rule action in the
area of prevailing wage rates, 87 the dissent would hold that Highland
Park's action was allowed.
Justice Miller characterized the majority's fears as "exaggerated"
and "unfounded." 88 He suggested that in computing the prevailing
wage rates, the Department of Labor was not required by statute to
include wages paid by home rule units which did not follow the
Act. 89 He also noted that the Prevailing Wage Act is different from

82.
83.
69 Ohio
84.

ILL. REV.
Bernardi,
St. 2d 88,
Id. at 15,

STAT. ch. 48, J 4a (1985).

121 I11.
2d at 14, 520 N.E.2d at 322 (quoting State ex rel. Evans v. Moore,
91, 431 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1982)).
520 N.E.2d at 322.
85. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(g), (h) (1970) provides:
(g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the
members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other
power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other
than a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this Section.
(h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise
by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing
power or a power of function specified in subsection (1) of this Section.
86. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(i) (1970) provides:
(i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power
or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law
does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's
exercise to be exclusive.
87. The dissent points out that in other legislation in the labor area, the legislature did
specifically preempt action by home rule units. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1615(c) (1985)
(Illinois Public Labor Relations Act).
88. Bernardi, 121 11. 2d at 20, 520 N.E.2d at 325.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 39s-4 (1985).
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other protective labor legislation. The Act applies only to public

projects, and wages under the Act can vary depending on the locality.
The other labor laws impose minimum standards throughout the
state.
At issue in City of Decatur v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, Local 268, 90 was the construction
of the section of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act 91which
requires a city to bargain collectively with a bargaining representative
of its employees on the question of "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other

law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law."

92

The union had proposed that matters of discipline be submitted
to mandatory arbitration. The city claimed that it had no duty to
bargain on this issue because it had adopted the civil service sections
of the municipal code. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board
rejected the municipality's argument and ordered it to bargain. The
Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District held that the duty to bargain
conflicted with provisions of the municipal code; consequently, by
the express provisions of the Labor Relations Act, the duty to bargain
must give way to the municipal code. 93

90. Nos. 64464 & 64483 (II1. March 30, 1988), rev'g City of Decatur v. Illinois State
Labor Relations Bd., 149 II1. App. 3d 319, 500 N.E.2d 573 (4th Dist. 1986) (available on
WESTLAW, IL-CS Database).
91. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1601-27 (1985).
92. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 48,
1607 (1985) provides:
A public employer and the exclusive representative have the authority and the
duty to bargain collectively set forth in this Section.
For the purposes of this Act, 'to bargain collectively' means the performance
of the mutual obligation of the public employer or his designated representative and
the representative of the public employees to meet at reasonable times, including
meetings in advance of the budgetmaking process, and to negotiate in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, not excluded by
Section 4 of this Act, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
The duty 'to bargain collectively' shall also include an obligation to negotiate
over any matter with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,
not specifically provided for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the
provisions of any law. If any other law pertains, in part to a matter affecting the
wages, hours and other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be
construed as limiting the duty 'to bargain collectively' and to enter into collective
bargaining agreements containing clauses which either supplement, implement, or
relate to the effect of such provisions in other laws.
93. City of Decatur v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 149 111.
App. 3d 319, 325, 500
N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (4th Dist. 1986), rev'd sub nom. City of Decatur v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 268, Nos. 64464 & 64483 (I11.
March 30,
1988).

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1060 1987-1988

19881

Municipal Corporations

1061

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the position of the Labor
Relations Board that the duty to bargain prevails over any conflicting
statutory provisions. 94 The court also rejected the Fourth District's
position that section 10-1-18 of the Municipal Code, which provides
for disciplinary procedures, limited the duty to bargain with the
union. 95
The supreme court first concluded that the duty to bargain could
be limited by statute because the labor statute includes the modifying
language "not specifically provided for in any other law or not
specifically in violation of the provisions of any law. ' 96 However,
based on the final sentence in the paragraph, the duty to bargain
could not be limited by another statute if that statute only "pertain[ed], in part, to. . .[or] supplemented[ed], implement[ed] or relate[d] to" the duty to bargain. 97 The question thus became which
of these two provisions was applicable to section 10-1-18 of the
Municipal Code.
The court noted that in construing the statutory provision, it
must determine the legislature's intent by considering the statute as
a whole. The court concluded that because the Labor Relations Act
is a comprehensive scheme for collective bargaining, it was unlikely
that "the legislature intended to make the broad duties imposed by
the Act hostage to the myriad of State statutes and local ordinances
pertaining to matters of public employment." 9
The court then analyzed the relevant section of the Municipal
Code. It noted that this section is optional; no municipality is required
to adopt the civil service provisions. Moreover, a municipality can
choose which sections to adopt and can, by ordinance, modify any
section it does adopt. 99 Consequently, the court concluded that "[g]iven
the purpose of the [Labor Relations] Act, the nature of that part of

94. City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Local 268, Nos. 64464 & 64483, slip op. at 5 (I11.
March 30, 1988).
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id. at 5 quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1607 (1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.at 7.
99. In the appellate court, the union argued that a holding in favor of the city would
allow home rule units to insulate themselves from collective bargaining. The Fourth District
responded to the union's concerns by focusing on the word, "law," in the Labor Relations
Act. The appellate court held that "law" included only acts of the legislature; it did not
include ordinances enacted by home rule municipalities. 149 I11.
App. 3d at 323, 500 N.E.2d
at 576. The supreme court apparently agreed with this analysis but questioned why the civil
service sections of the municipal code should be considered "law" since they were adopted by
referendum of the voters in Decatur, not imposed by the state legislature. Slip op. at 4-5.
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the civil service system at issue here, and the legislature's express
preference for arbitration as a method for resolving disputes" under
labor contracts, the city had a duty to bargain on the question of
arbitration of disciplinary disputes.10°
Litigation attacking two taxes imposed by the Chicago City
Council reached the courts this year. In Forsberg v. City of Chicago,'0 1 four individuals and two boat owners' associations' 012 sued
the city, claiming that the imposition of a boat mooring tax was
unconstitutional on several different bases. This was the second case
that attacked the constitutionality of the mooring tax. In January,
1986, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Chicago Park District v. City
03 held that the tax was within the powers granted
of Chicago,1
to a
home rule unit under the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The power to
tax is included in home rule municipalities' power to perform any
function of government.' °4 Illinois case law dictates that the exercise
of the power to tax, like other home rule powers, is broad and
should be construed liberally. 0 The Chicago Park District court
refused to find that the tax equal to 500o of the fee charged by the
Park District for mooring was an unreasonable burden or an abuse
of the city's home rule power. °6
Many of the issues decided by the supreme court were raised
again by the plaintiffs in Forsberg. The First District briefly rejected
those arguments. One issue common to both the Forsberg litigation
and the tax in Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur'0 7 was whether
the tax was an occupation tax prohibited by the Illinois Constitu0 The First District noted that the Illinois Constitution
tion. 1°
provides

100. Slip op. at 9.
101. 151 I1. App. 3d 354, 502 N.E.2d 283 (Ist Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 II. 2d 545,
508 N.E. 2d 727 (1987).
102.

The court held that the boating associations had no standing to challenge the tax

because they had not suffered direct injury, and the associations could not sue in their
representative capacity because Illinois does not follow the federal standard of representative
capacity.
103.
I11 1l1. 2d 7, 16-17, 488 N.E.2d 968, 973 (1986).
104. ILL. CoNST. art VII, § 6(a) (1970).

105. Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 111. 2d 544, 549-51, 338 N.E.2d 6, 10-11 (1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 916 (1976).
106. In Chicago Park Dist., Ill Ill. 2d at 16, 488 N.E.2d at 973, the court noted that if
the legislature believed that the 50% tax was an abuse of home rule power, the legislature
could remedy the situation.
107. 155 I1. App. 3d 482, 488-89, 508 N.E.2d 742, 746-47 (Ist Dist. 1987). See infra note
114 and accompanying text.
108. Forsberg, 151 11. App. 3d at 368, 502 N.E.2d at 295. The court also upheld the tax
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that home rule units may not impose occupation taxes.' °9 "An
occupation tax either regulates or controls a given business or occupation, or imposes a tax for the privilege of exercising, undertaking
or operating a given occupation, trade or possession." 110
However,
an excise tax does not become an occupation tax merely because
some boat owners subject to the tax use the boats in their businesses.
The First District also upheld Chicago's tax on health clubs''
in Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur,"2 through the statutory
authorization for amusement taxes.' 3 The plaintiffs argued that the

against several other attacks not related to home rule issues. First, the court held that the tax
is not extraterritorial since it is imposed on those who enter Chicago harbors, use Chicago
facilities and pay mooring and docking fees in Chicago even though they may reside outside
of Chicago. Id. at 361, 502 N.E.2d at 290. Second, the tax is not invalid as a tax on the
affairs of the tax exempt park district because it is a tax on the patrons, not on the harbor
or district. Id. at 362, 502 N.E.2d at 291. Third, the size of the tax and the penalties (6
months imprisonment) does not shock the conscience of reasonable persons and hence does
not violate due process. Id. at 363, 502 N.E.2d at 292. Fourth, the city council is permitted
to define a subclass without imposing a tax on all boat owners. Id. at 364, 502 N.E.2d at
292. Fifth, the mooring tax does not restrict movement upon navigable waters in violation of
interstate commerce clause; it is only imposed for use of facilities within Chicago. Id. at 36566, 502 N.E.2d at 293. Sixth the general revenue mooring tax need not be supported by
specific benefits for those who are being taxed. Id. at 367, 502 N.E.2d at 294. Seventh, the
tax is not a penalty on persons who have exercised their right to travel since it is imposed
regardless of whether they have recently arrived or never left the city. Id.
109. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (1970) provides in part: "(e) A home rule unit shall have
only the power that the General Assembly may provide by law .. . (2) to license for revenue
or impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon occupations."
110. 151 Ill. App. 3d at 368, 502 N.E.2d at 295.
111. Chicago, IL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 104-1-104-8 (1984) creates a tax on the right to
participate or view amusements. In December of 1985, the city council amended the list of
amusements in the ordinance to include "racquetball or health clubs ...,tennis, racquetball,
swimming, weightlifting, body building or similar activities.
Chicago, IL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 104-1(2).
When an amusement is located both within and without the City of Chicago, the tax is
only imposed on the percentage of the fee allocated to participation in the city. The owner of
the amusement collects the tax, but the customer is liable if the owner fails to pay.
112. 155 Il.App. 3d 482, 508 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist.), appeal granted, 116 I1l. 2d 549,
515 N.E.2d 103 (1987).
113. The court discussed several other issues in deciding this case. The court held that the
tax was not unconstitutionally overbroad because the threshold requirement of a constitutionally
protected right did not exist. Id. at 491, 508 N.E.2d at 748. The court also held that the tax
was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because its definition of amusement was
adequate. Id. at 492, 508 N.E.2d at 749. Next, the court held that the tax did not violate the
equal protection clause because the classifications contained in the statute were reasonable. Id.
at 493, 508 N.E.2d at 750.
The court also held that the tax also did not violate the prohibition against extraterritorial
taxes because suburban members of some health clubs are only paying for the privilege of
using facilities located within the city. Id. at 495, 508 N.E.2d at 750. It is irrelevant that some
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tax on health clubs was an occupation tax prohibited by the Illinois
Constitution. 1 14 However, the court refused to discuss whether the
tax on health clubs was an occupation tax because the Illinois
Supreme Court recently "confused" the issue when it decided Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago."5 Instead, it held that
the tax was an amusement tax authorized by the Municipal Code." 6
The section of the Illinois Constitution that prohibits occupation
taxes includes an exception for those which are allowed pursuant to
statute." 7 Therefore, the court held that because health and racquetball clubs fall within the definition of amusements, the health club

tax is constitutional because there is statutory authorization for
8
amusement taxes.1
The dissent focused specifically on CommercialNational Bank." 9
In 1981, the Chicago City Council enacted a service tax ordinance
which was challenged as an unconstitutional occupation tax. 20 The
Illinois Supreme Court discussed at length the debate at the 1970
Illinois constitutional convention on the provision prohibiting home
rule units from enacting occupation taxes. The court concluded that
because the service tax had the effect of taxing occupations, it was
an unconstitutional occupation tax.' 2' The court noted that merely
imposing the tax on the purchaser (while giving the seller the duty
of collection) did not change the nature of the tax. 22

may not choose to use those facilities. The Court relied on the mooring tax case of Forsberg,
see supra note 89. The dissent questioned the extraterritorial effect of the tax because, as
drafted, an individual could purchase a membership from a club located outside of the city,
never enter the city and yet be taxed based on square footage of club facilities located within
the city. Id. at 510, 508 N.E.2d at 760. Neither the majority nor the dissent noted that
Forsberg is distinguishable because the seller of the mooring, the Chicago Park District, was
only located within the city.
Finally, the court held that the tax did not violate the Illinois constitutional prohibition
against special legislation because by its very terms, the section only applies to the General
Assembly. Id. at 495, 508 N.E. 2d at 751; see ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).
114. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
115. 89 II1. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
11-42-5 (1985).
117. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
118. Picur, 155 III. App. 3d at 487, 502 N.E.2d at 746. The First District has held on
two occasions that Section 11-42-5 of the Municipal Code survived the adoption of the 1970
Illinois Constitution. Wellington v. City of Chicago, 144 I11. App. 3d 774, 494 N.E.2d 603
(1st Dist. 1986); Isberian v. Village of Gurnee, 116 Il. App. 3d 146, 452 N.E.2d 10 (1st Dist.
1983).
119. 89 II1. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
120. Id. at 48, 432 N.E.2d at 228.
121. Id. at 49, 432 N.E.2d at 229.
122. Id. at 80, 432 N.E.2d at 244.
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The dissent in Chicago Health Clubs stated that it was impossible
to address the constitutionality of the tax on health clubs without
first determining whether it was a forbidden service tax under Commercial National Bank. 123 The dissent argued that only if the tax was
determined not to be an occupation (or service) tax, can the court
then analyze whether it was within the authorization for amusement
taxes.
While the majority should not have ignored the Illinois Supreme
Court decision in Commercial National Bank, the majority, and not
the dissent, was correct in its analysis of the health club tax. The
Illinois Constitution provides in section 6(e) that home rule units
only have the power to tax occupations provided by statute. It is
irrelevant whether the tax on health clubs is an occupation tax if it
is provided for by statute. If the tax on health clubs is properly
characterized as an amusement, 124 then it is provided for by statute
and is, therefore, a constitutional exercise of the home rule power.
In Beverly Bank v. County of Cook,"5 the plaintiffs sought a
zoning change which would allow them to develop a sanitary landfill
and reclamation project. 126 The trial court held that the zoning
ordinance was both reasonable and constitutional. The plaintiffs
appealed the question of whether Cook County's zoning authority is
preempted by the Illinois Surface-Mined Land Conservation and
Reclamation Act. 127 The plaintiffs relied on American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. County of Knox, 21 which held that a county could
not use zoning to affect strip-mining reclamation standards. The
county argued that American Smelting was distinguishable because
129
it did not involve a home rule county.

123. Id.
124. Whether membership in a health club is properly characterized as an amusement
depends largely on one's attitude toward exercise.
125. 157 I11.App. 3d 601, 510 N.E.2d 941 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 117 I11.2d 541, 517
N.E.2d 1084 (1987).
126. In 1975, this plaintiff filed an action against the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency seeking to declare invalid the requirement of a zoning change by the county as a
condition of building the landfill. This court in Carlson v. Briceland, 61 11. App. 3d 247, 377
N.E.2d 1138 (1st Dist. 1978), modified, 75 IIl. 2d 589, 401 N.E.2d 1390 (1979), held that the
permit was subject to county zoning. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case for further
consideration in light of its decision in County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75
Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, 1 4501-4520 (1985).
128. 60 Ill. 2d 133, 324 N.E.2d 398 (1974).
129. Beverly Bank, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 162, 510 N.E.2d at 945.
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The First District noted that both the Reclamation Act and the
Environmental Protection Act 130 regulate sanitary landfills."' The
court reasoned that the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held
that determination of locations of landfills in home rule units is
within the sole jurisdiction of those units.3 2 Cook County is a home
rule unit, and home rule units may act concurrently with the state
so long as a statute does not expressly designate an area exclusively
state controlled. The court distinguished American Smelting because
Knox and Peoria Counties were not home rule units.'
Thus, the
court held that Cook County, a home rule unit, could regulate
31 4
reclamation of sanitary landfills concurrently with the state.

130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2,
1001-1052 (1985).
131. Beverly Bank, 157 I1. App. 3d at 162, 510 N.E.2d at 945.
132. Id.; See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 111. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d
553 (1979); Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 103 Ill. 2d 302, 469 N.E.2d 183
(1984).
133. Although the First District distinguished American Smelting on the basis that the
counties were not home rule units, the Illinois Supreme Court in American Smelting did not
discuss the home rule issue. In American Smelting, the court's holding that there was "simply
no demonstrable basis upon which concurrent State and county regulation of reclamation
standards may be permitted" was not limited to non home rule units. 60 Ill. 2d at 140, 324
N.E.2d at 402. The court relied on its earlier decision in O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52
Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972) which had held that county zoning powers could not be
used to prevent or regulate the building of a sanitary landfill that had been approved by the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Environmental Protection Act.
However, after the decisions in American Smelting and O'Connor, the Illinois Supreme
Court decided County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d
553 (1979). In Sexton, the Environmental Protection Agency had issued a permit to Sexton
for the operation of a sanitary landfill. The issue was whether Cook County, a home rule
unit, could require Sexton to comply with its zoning regulations. The supreme court analyzed
its preceding decisions in O'Connor and City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 II1. 2d
484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974). The supreme court, in O'Connor, held that the Environmental
Protection Act prevents regulation by local governmental units; the supreme court, in Chicago
v. Pollution Control Bd., held that a local governmental unit can act concurrently with the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Environmental Protection Act. The supreme court,
in Sexton, reconciled these two cases by limiting the O'Connor holding to non home rule units
and limiting Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd. to home rule units.
The supreme court in Sexton did not address the American Smelting decision. However,
the supreme court in American Smelting had analogized the Environmental Protection Act to
the Reclamation Act. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that after Sexton, American
Smelting is properly limited to non home rule units. Since the supreme court has considered
the preemption question at length in the analogous areas of environmental control and
reclamation, it is probable that these decisions, including the First District's decision in Beverly
Bank, are probably not affected by People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park.
134. Beverly Bank, 157 11. App. 2d at 163, 510 N.E.2d at 946. The court also refused to
estop the county from enforcing its zoning ordinances merely because it had failed to object
to the plaintiff's mining permit or reclamation plans. The court noted that mere inaction by
a governmental unit is not sufficient to invoke estoppel. Here, the county had never indicated
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The Seventh Circuit certified two questions to the Illinois Supreme Court in Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v. Village of
Wauconda.'" A non home rule unit passed an ordinance regulating
the use of pesticides. The ordinance requires commercial pest control
operators to register with the village, to post certain notices after
application of pesticides and limits applications of certain pesticides
when winds are high. The two questions presented were: 1) Does a
non home rule unit have the authority to enact such an ordinance?
and 2)"Is the ordinance preempted by the Illinois Pesticide Act and
1 36
the Illinois Structural Pest Control Act?
The court first analyzed the origin of municipal powers. Non
13 7
home rule units only have powers granted by the Illinois Constitution
and those granted by the legislature. Thus "municipalities possess
only those powers expressly granted, powers incident to those expressly granted, and powers indispensable to the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation."'3
Municipalities are not expressly granted the power to regulate pesticides; neither is that power indispensable to the accomplishment of
municipal purposes. Therefore, the power must be incident to a
power expressly granted to municipalities.
Statutes granting power to a municipal corporation are construed
strictly against the municipality claiming the right to exercise the
power. 13 9 Illinois Municipal Code section 11-20-5 provides: "The
corporate authorities of each municipality may do all acts and make
all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion
of health or the suppression of diseases ..... " This ordinance is
within the village's authority to promote the public health. Therefore,

that the zoning change was approved; therefore, mere inaction by the county did not invoke
estoppel. Moreover, the grant of a special use permit in 1960 allowing strip mining was not
the type of action which would invoke estoppel. The court noted first that while the strip
mining did create a situation that requires reclamation, this does not entitle the landowner to
create a sanitary landfill as the method of reclamation. Finally, a permit issued 15 years ago
does not forever bind a governmental unit when health and safety concerns are involved.
135. 117 Ill. 2d 107, 510 N.E.2d 858 (1987).
136. Id.
137. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1970).
138. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d at 112, 510 N.E.2d at 861.
139. The court first rejected the argument that the power to regulate pesticides could be
based on section 11-19.1-11 of the Municipal Code. That section authorizes municipalities to
regulate activities that cause air contamination for the purpose of lessening the contamination.
Since this ordinance does not lessen the discharge of pesticides but only regulates the time and
location of application, power to enact it cannot be implied from this section of the municipal
code. Moreover, the ordinance also applies to solid pesticides and pesticides used indoors.
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the supreme court held that Wauconda had the authority to enact
the ordinance regulating pesticides.' 4
The court then addressed the preemption issue. The Illinois
Pesticide Act of 1979 and the Structural Pest Control Act are broad
in scope and are enforced by the Departments of Agriculture and
Public Health and the State Environmental Protection Agency. 14 The
Wauconda ordinance regulates activities that are within the powers
of these departments. Since the legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation, there is no room for additional regulation
by municipalities. 142 The state statutes have no provision delegating
authority to or allowing regulation by units of local government.
Moreover, these acts specifically empower the departments to act for
the purposes of insuring uniformity.141 Clearly, the legislature intended that the state alone occupy the field of pesticide regulation.
IV.
A.

TORT LIABILITY

Intoxicated Drivers

In recent years societal concern about the problem of drunk
driving has increased exponentially. One outgrowth of the concern
has been litigation against police officers who fail to arrest drunk
drivers they have stopped. In the landmark decision of Irwin v.
Town of Ware,' 44 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held

140. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 Ill. 2d at 113, 510 N.E.2d at 864.
141. The supreme court discussed at length its decision in Sexton, see supra note 134 and
accompanying text, and again drew the distinction between home rule and non home rule
units in the environmental field. Thus, it is unlikely that this decision would affect the outcome
of Beverly Bank. See supra note 129.
142. Pesticide Public Policy Foundation, 117 II1. 2d at 110, 510 N.E.2d at 861. American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Knox, 60 I11.2d 133, 324 N.E.2d 398 (1974); Chicago
School Transit, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 35 I11.2d 82, 219 N.E.2d 522 (1966).
143. The court rejected the municipality's argument that there was no desire for uniformity
because there was no prohibition against regulation by home rule units. While not deciding
the question of whether regulation by home rule units would be preempted under this act, the
court noted that in other areas where the state desired uniformity, home rule units were still
allowed to regulate. Compare County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 I11. 2d
494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979) (home rule unit) with County of Kendall v. Avery Gravel Co.,
101 I11.2d 428, 463 N.E.2d 723 (1984) (non home rule unit).
144. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). In Irwin, two police officers stopped a driver
for speeding. They admitted that they smelled alcohol on his breath but neither took him into
custody nor even gave him a field sobriety test. A nurse, who was an eyewitness to the stop,
testified to the driver's obvious signs of intoxication. Ten minutes after the police stop, the
driver hit another car and killed two of its occupants.
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that a municipality can be held liable for injuries caused by the
failure of its police officers to take an intoxicated motorist into
custody. 145 Likewise, in Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 1 4 6 the Kansas
Supreme Court held that police officers can be held liable when they
are required to follow internal guidelines relating to detaining intoxicated individuals.1 47 Five Illinois decisions in the past year1 48 in three

145. The Fifth District in Luber v. City of Highland, 151 Il. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d
1243 (5th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 Il1. 2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987), and the Fourth
District in Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc., 161 11. App. 3d 290, 514 N.E.2d 515 (4th Dist. 1987),
appeal denied, 118 Ill. 2d 542, 520 N.E.2d 385 (1988), specifically refused to follow Irwin.
Although not discussed by these cases, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is significantly
different from Illinois'.
The Massachusetts act provides that "[p]ublic employers shall be liable for injury ...
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting
within the scope of his office or employment in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances." G.L.C. 258 § 2 (1978). There is an exception
to liability for failure to exercise a discretionary function. G.L.C. § 10(b). However, there is
no exemption for liability analogous to §§ 4-102 and 4-107 of Illinois' act which preclude
liability for police officers who fail to enforce statutes.
The court in Irwin noted that under Massachusetts law, discretionary acts are ones which
require substantial discretion in weighing public policy choices; discretion does not mean acting
in accord with established plans. Hence, the decision of a police officer to remove an intoxicated
driver from the roadway is not discretionary.
The court then held that police have a duty to protect the general public from intoxicated
drivers. Because the defendant could reasonably foresee the harm to the plaintiff, a "special
relationship" was created which gave rise to liability.
The court remanded for a new trial because certain evidence was improperly admitted. In
addition, damages were limited to $100,000 per plaintiff pursuant to statute.
146. 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986). In Fudge, a bartender called the police when a
drunk customer who was belligerent refused to leave. When the police arrived, the drunk was
in the parking lot with others; the police approached to within five feet and told everyone to
leave. The man was visibly intoxicated, but the police officers did not stop him from driving
his car. As the drunk driver pulled out of the parking lot he almost collided with another
police car, but the officers did not stop him. A few minutes later, the drunk driver hit Fudge's
van; Fudge died of injuries received in the accident. The drunk driver's blood alcohol level
was .26.
147. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court first considered whether the police officers owed
Fudge a duty. The court considered whether this case was within the special duty exception
to the public duty doctrine. The Kansas City Police Department procedures required that
officers must take into protective custody any individual who was alcohol impaired and was
likely to injure himself or others. Relying on earlier Kansas decisions, the court concluded
that because the Kansas City Police Department's guidelines were mandatory, the officers had
no discretion and hence, had a duty to take the drunk driver into custody. Utilizing the
RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965), the court held that it was foreseeable that
the drunk driver would cause injury to third parties; therefore, the special duty to the drunk
driver became a duty to Fudge. The Fourth District in Fessler characterized this analysis by
the Kansas Supreme Court as a "leap in reasoning." 161 11. App. 3d at 301, 514 N.E.2d at
522 (1987).
The Kansas Supreme Court next considered whether any statutory immunity provisions were
applicable. These provisions are similar to Illinois'. The court concluded that the language
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appellate districts149 refused to hold the police liable in this type of
situation. The courts rejected liability on two bases: tort immunity
and lack of a special duty.
In Luber v. City of Highland,50 the plaintiff was injured when
he was struck by a car driven by a drunk driver. Six minutes prior
to the accident, the police had stopped the drunk driver for erratic
driving. The Fifth District upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint because the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act 5 ' protects a municipality for failure of
its agents to enforce the law. Specifically, section 4-102 insulates a
municipality and its agents from liability for "failure to prevent the
commission of crimes' ' 5 2 and section 4-107 precludes liability for
"failure [of an officer] to make an arrest."' 53 The court also held
that the city would not be liable even if the officer's actions constituted willful and wanton misconduct because the sections insulating
the municipality and officers from liability prevail over the language
54
which gives rise to liability for willful and wanton misconduct.
The court in Luber also rejected the "special duty" exception
to the tort immunity doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized
this exception in Huey v. Town of Cicero,'5 5 and, in Curtis v. County

"failure to provide, or the method of providing police or fire protection," K.S.A. 75-6104(m),
was not intended to immunize a police department on every aspect of negligent police protection
but was only directed at matters such as the number of police officers hired. Next, the court
decided that the liability exception for "enforcement of or failure to enforce a law," K.S.A.
75-6104(c), was not applicable because liability in this case was premised on the officer's
failure to follow internal rules, not failure to enforce a law. Finally, the exception from
liability for "discretionary acts," K.S.A. 75-6104(d), was held inapplicable because the officers
had no discretion because they were required to follow mandatory procedures.
After considering other issues, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a comparative negligence verdict against the city for 1807o fault on a damage award of $1 million.
148. November, 1986 - November, 1987.
149. First, fourth and fifth.
150. 151 I11. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243 (5th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d
547, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987).
1-101 - 10-101 (1985).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
4-102 (1985) provides:
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish
a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police
protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or
service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend
criminals.
4-107 (1985) provides: "Neither a local public entity nor a
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
public employee is liable for an injury caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing
a person in custody."
2-202 (1985).
154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
155. 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968).
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of Cook, 15 6 rephrased it as a four prong test. The test requires that:
"(1) the municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger
or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2) there must be allegations of
specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipality; (3) the
specific acts or omissions must be either affirmative or willful in
nature; and (4) the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the
direct and immediate control of employees or agents of the municipality."'1 5 7 When all four elements are present, a special duty exists

and the municipality can be held liable. In Luber, the court held
that because there was no claim that the driver injured the plaintiff
while the driver was under the direct control of police, the plaintiff
did not satisfy the fourth prong of the special duty test and could
not recover.
All the other intoxicated motorist cases in Illinois this year also
focus on the fourth prong of the test in rejecting plaintiffs' allegations
of special duty. In Hernandez v. Village of Cicero,' a police officer
stopped and ticketed the plaintiff's decedent for speeding; less than
10 minutes later another officer stopped and ticketed the decedent
for speeding. Fifteen minutes later he was killed when his car struck
a traffic light; he was intoxicated. The First District held that stopping
the decedent for traffic violations and issuing traffic citations were
not the equivalent of taking him into custody. Because he was not
in custody, the police were not exercising the control over him at
the time of the accident as required by the fourth prong of the
special duty test. Therefore, because the special duty exception was
not satisfied, the municipality was not liable for his death.
In Seibring v. Parcell's Inc.,159 two police officers broke up a
fight involving the decedent. The officers then transported the intoxicated decedent back to his automobile. The Fourth District followed
Hernandez and held that the officers did not have a special duty to
the decedent because they did not have direct and immediate control
60
over the decedent at the time he was killed.

156. 19 I11.
App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1st Dist. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
98 II1. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116 (1983).
157. Id. at 407, 440 N.E.2d at 947.
158. 151 I11.
App. 3d 170, 502 N.E.2d 1226 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 115 Il. 2d
541, 511 N.E.2d 428 (1987).
159. 59 I11.
App. 3d 676, 512 N.E.2d 394 (4th Dist. 1987).
160. Accord Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 290, 514 N.E.2d 515 (4th Dist. 1987),
appeal denied, 118 II1. 2d 542, 520 N.E.2d 385 (1988).

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1071 1987-1988

1072

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

The most recent case decided on this issue is Schaffrath v.
Village of Buffalo Grove. 16' A Buffalo Grove police officer stopped
a driver because the car's muffler was noisy. Eight miles later, in
another town, the driver crossed the center line and hit a concrete
abutment. The driver's blood alcohol level was .09.162 Because the
defendant municipality carried liability insurance, it waived its immunities; therefore, the court could not rely on the tort immunity
act. 63 The court began its analysis by stating that police have only
a general duty to the public which does not give rise to liability. The
court then considered whether the police had a special duty to these
individual members of the public under the four prong test discussed
above. Since the accident occurred in another town, the court held
that the police obviously had no control over the driver, and hence,
the city was not liable because the police did not owe the driver a
special duty.164
The application of the special duty exception also arose in
litigation following the strike by Chicago firefighters in February of
1980. In Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, 65 the owners of
property that was damaged by fire during the strike sued the firefighters' union, the city and various governmental officials. The court
held, on two grounds, that the firefighters had no legal duty to the
property owners. First, if the firefighters were not acting within the
scope of their employment at the time they failed to tend the fire,
then they were private citizens and had no duty to provide fire
protection. Alternatively, if the defendants were acting as firefighters,
they were protected by the tort immunity act.
The plaintiff contended that the firefighters' refusal to comply
with the injunction ordering them back to work and their failure to
tend a fire constituted willful and wanton misconduct.' 66 Section 2202 of the Tort Immunity Act, which creates the general rule that a

161. 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 513 N.E.2d 1026 (1st. Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Il1. 2d 553,
517 N.E.2d 1095 (1987).
162. A blood alcohol level of .10 is required for conviction of driving while under the
influence of alcohol. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
l1-501(a)(l) (1985).
163. Schaffrath, 160 11. App. 3d at 1002, 513 N.E. 2d at 1028.
164. Id. at 1002, 513 N.E.2d at 1029. The court also refused to create an exception because
the passenger was a minor or because there is a strong public policy against drunk driving.
Moreover the court held that there was no cause of action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for failure
of the police to adequately protect the public since there is no constitutional right to basic
public services.
165. 160 I1. App. 3d 975, 513 N.E.2d 1002 (1st Dist. 1987).
166. Id. at 976, 513 N.E.2d at 1003.
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governmental employee is not liable for his negligence, includes an
exception for willful and wanton misconduct. 167 However, section 5101 immunizes municipalities for failure "to provide fire protection
service" and section 5-102 precludes liability "for an injury resulting
from the failure to suppress or contain a fire. . . ." Like the immunity available to police officers,1 68 the immunity for firefighters is
unconditional; it is not limited by the exception in section 2-202.
Finally, the court analyzed the question of liability based on a
"special duty" theory. The court held that the fact that the fire
station was across the street from the property did not constitute
control. Even if the firefighters actually knew of the fire, their
knowledge would not constitute control. "The pivotal fact is whether
... the firefighter was responsible for the occurrence which gave
rise to the need for protection."'' 69 Since the firefighters were not
responsible for the fire, they were not in control and had no "special
170
duty" to the owners of the premises.
B.

Intended Users

The Governmental Tort Immunity Act provides in section 3102a that a governmental entity only has a duty of ordinary care to
those "whom the entity intended and permitted to use the property.' 17' This "intended user" doctrine is frequently employed to
relieve a municipality of liability when the plaintiff was injured while
violating a municipal ordinance.
In Risner v City of Chicago,72 plaintiff was injured when he
crossed a street in the middle of a block and was hit by a bus. The
First District held that city owed no duty to the plaintiff because he

167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 2-202 (1985) provides: "A public employee is not liable for
his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission
constitutes willful and wanton negligence."
168. See Luber, 151 I11. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243 (1986).
169. Jackson, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 982, 513 N.E.2d at 1007.
170. Id.
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
3-102(a) (1985) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the duty to
exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for
the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and
permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. . ..
172. 150 Ill. App. 3d 827, 502 N.E.2d 357 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 114 111.2d 557,
508 N.E. 2d 735 (1987).
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was a jaywalker and hence not a permitted or intended user'73 as
74
required by the statute.
In Durham v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County,'7 5 a
sixteen year old drowned in a muddy retention pond in a forest
preserve. The boys had turned a picnic table upside down and used
it as a raft. "No Swimming" signs were posted around the pond.
The court held on two independent grounds that there was no
liability. First, there was no duty because the pond was an open, and
obvious danger of which plaintiff should have been aware. 76 Second,
under section 3-102 of the tort immunity act, plaintiff was not within
the class of intended users.
C. DiscretionaryActs
In Midamerica Trust Company v. Moffatt,'17 the plaintiff, guardian of the estates of three minor children, sued the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"). Two of the three
children 78 had been removed from the custody of their natural mother
and made wards of DCFS. Fourteen months later, they were returned
to their mother who subsequently injured them. The Fifth District
upheld the trial court's grant of the department's motion to dismiss
because a social worker for DCFS is entitled to public official
immunity for discretionary acts which are not corrupt or malicious.
This immunity is not lost for willful and wanton misconduct. The
court also noted that while an exception exists for professionals such
as physicians who have duties to individuals independent of their
status as governmental employees, an unlicensed social worker is not
such a professional. 179

173. Id. at 826, 502 N.E.2d at 359. The court also rejected the argument that because the
plaintiff's use was foreseeable, the city had a duty. The court held that the word foreseeable
in section 3-102(a) modifies times of use, not the existence of a duty.
174. Id. The court held that duty was a question of law to be decided by the judge.
175. 152 Ill. App. 3d 472, 504 N.E.2d 899 (1st Dist. 1987).
176. The court relied on Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 73 Il1. 2d 316, 383 N.E.2d
177 (1978) and succeeding cases for the proposition that a property owner has no duty "to
remedy conditions the obvious risks of which children generally would be expected to appreciate
and avoid." Id. at 474, 504 N.E.2d at 901.
177. 158 Il. App. 3d 372, 511 N.E.2d 964 (5th Dist. 1987).
178. Id. The DCFS never was guardian of the third child. The Department was merely
required to "monitor" the third child who was in the mother's custody.
179. Id. at 375, 511 N.E.2d at 969.
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D. Notice180

The Tort Immunity Act requires that within one year after the
injury has occurred, the plaintiff must serve written notice on the
defendant-governmental entity.' 81 The one-year notice period is independent of the two year statute of limitations. The notice must
include the facts surrounding the accident, the name and address of
the plaintiff and the name and address of both the attending physician
and the hospital. Failure to include any of these factors is fatal to
the notice. 8 2 However, so long as there is substantial compliance
with the statute, notice will be sufficient.
The purpose of the notice is to allow a governmental unit to
investigate the accident while the events and witnesses are still fresh.' 83
Moreover, it allows the governmental unit to correct any problems
to avoid future accidents.
In Carroll v. Chicago Housing Authority, s4 the notice stated
the "Claimant was caused to become injured due to the negligence
of the Chicago Housing Authority."' 8 5 The First District held that
although the notice requirement is to be liberally construed, specifying
only that it was a negligence personal injury claim was not suffi-

cient. 186
180. The section of the tort immunity act on notice was repealed effective November 25,
1986. (Pub. Act 84-1431, Art. I, § 3). In addition, there is now a one year statute of limitations
for all tort actions against municipalities. (Pub. Act 84-1431, Art. I, § 2). Those causes of
action which arose prior to November 25, 1986, still have a two year statute of limitations,
and consequently, plaintiffs were still required to file notice within one year.
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
8-102 (1985) provides:
Within I year from the date that the injury or cause of action, referred to in
Sections 8-101, 8-102 and 8-103, was received or accrued, any person who is about
to commence any civil action for damages on account of such injury against a local
public entity, or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed while
acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused the injury, must
serve, either by personal service or by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, a written notice on the Secretary or Clerk, as the case may be, for the
entity against whom or against whose employee the action is contemplated a written
statement, signed by himself, his agent or attorney, giving in substance the following
information: the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the
name and residence of the person injured, the date and about the hour of the
accident, the place or location where the accident occurred, the general nature of
the accident, the name and address of the attending physician, if any, and the name
and address of the treating hospital or hospitals, if any.
182. See Shortt v. City of Chicago, 160 I11.
App. 3d 933, 514 N.E.2d 3 (1st Dist.), appeal
denied, 117 I11.
2d 553, 516 N.E.2d 271 (1987).
183. Id.
184. 155 I11.
App. 3d 710, 508 N.E.2d 285 (1st Dist. 1987).
185. Id. at 711, 508 N.E.2d at 286.
186. Id.
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In Shortt v. Chicago,"7 notice was sent to the corporation
counsel, not the city clerk. The First District held that such notice
did not comply with the requirements of the tort immunity act; actual
notice to the city is inadequate.'88 Moreover, the city is not estopped
from arguing that notice was improper merely because it filed an
answer, conducted discovery and entered settlement negotiations over
a five/year period.
In contrast, the plaintiff in Whitney v. City of Chicago,Is9 filed
an amended complaint which alleged new causes of action. The First
District held that the complaint could not be dismissed for failure
to give statutory notice because the new actions were based on the
same facts. The court reasoned that the statutory requirement of
notice to the city under the tort immunity act only requires general
notice of the facts surrounding the accident not nature of the cause
of action. Moreover, the notice requirement must be strictly construed
against the city so long as the city was not misled or prejudiced.
In Grady v. Bi-State Development Agency, 190 the court first held
that the Bi-State Development Agency is a local public entity and
therefore covered by the Tort Immunity Act.'91 The court then held
that plaintiff did not substantially comply with the notice requirements of the tort immunity act because several elements were completely omitted from the notice: specifically, the notice did not include
the plaintiff's address, the time of the accident, the nature of the
accident or the name of the attending physician or hospital.
The dissent concluded that there was no prejudice and there was
substantial compliance. 92 The dissent correctly determined that the
notice indicated that this was a bus accident resulting in personal
injuries, and such information should be sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of notice of the nature of the accident.

187. 160 I11. App. 3d 933, 514 N.E.2d 3 (Ist Dist.), appeal denied, 117 I11. 2d 553, 516
N.E. 2d 271 (1987).
188. See Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 60 Ill. 2d 185, 326 N.E.2d 771 (1975).
189. 155 Ill. App. 3d 714, 508 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1987).
190. 151 I11.App. 3d 748, 502 N.E.2d 1087 (5th Dist. 1986).
191. Id. The court based its decision on two statutes. First, The act under which the
defendant was established provides that it "shall be a body corporate and politic." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 127,
63r-1 (1985). Second, the defendant is an interstate transportation authority.
The definition of such an authority is "any political subdivision created by compact between
this State and another state ....
The court concluded that a political subdivision was a local
public entity under the tort immunity act.
192. Id. at 751, 502 N.E.2d at 1090.

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1076 1987-1988

Municipal Corporations

1988]

1077

The dissent then explained why the other missing elements were
either not important or were easily ascertainable by defense counsel. 93
This analysis is inconsistent with established case law in Illinois that
no element required by statute to be included in the notice can be
missing; only if an element of notice is present can it be construed
in a light favorable to the plaintiff. Therefore, the mere fact that
the purposes of the act were satisfied and there was no prejudice
has historically not been relevant.
Finally, in Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 94 the plaintiff argued that notice was not required because public carriers were
excluded from the act under section 2-101(b). 195 The court held that
this section means that public carriers owe their passengers the highest
degree of care in contrast to the lower standard of care applicable
to other public entities. The language in section 2-101(b) does not,
however, exempt a plaintiff from the notice requirement. The court
noted that to eliminate the notice requirement would be illogical in
light of the fact that the Chicago Transit Authority has a six month
notice requirement. It is unlikely that the legislature would require a
six month notice period for one transit company but dispense entirely
with notice to all other common carriers.
E.

Duty

In Curry v. Chicago Housing Authority,' 96 a woman died when
paramedics had to climb seven stories to get to her and then carry
her down seven stories because the elevator in the public housing
project was out of service. The court held that the Chicago Housing
Authority had no duty to repair an elevator in order to put it back
into service within a specified period of time. The court also held
that various statutes relating to maintenance of elevators are either
requirements for inspection or only relate to operation of unsafe
elevators. They do not create a duty to keep an elevator operable.
"While an inoperable elevator may cause some discomfort, it is

193. Id.
194. 158 Ill.
App. 3d 19, 510 N.E.2d 1288 (5th Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Ill.
2d 550, 515
N.E.2d 104 (1987).
195. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
2-101 (1985) provides:
Nothing in this Act affects the right to obtain relief other than damages against a
local public entity or public employee. Nothing in the Act affects the liability, if
any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on: .. .(b) Operation as a
common carrier; and this Act does not apply to any entity organized under or
subject to the 'Metropolitan Transit Authority Act' ....
196. 150 Ill. App. 3d 862, 503 N.E.2d 1055 (lst Dist. 1986).
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nonetheless, not the type of circumstance in which public policy
would be furthered. .. "191 by imposing a duty. It is in society's best
interest that elevators which may be dangerous are not kept in
operation merely to avoid tort liability.
In Charpentier v. City of Chicago,198 the plaintiffs were injured
when a car driving the opposite direction crossed the center line and
hit the plaintiffs. There were no median barriers separating traffic
flowing in opposite directions. The common law requires municipalities to keep public property in a reasonably safe condition. However,
the court noted that this responsibility does not extend to undertaking
capital improvements. Thus, the city had no common law duty to
install median barriers. Section 3-103a of the tort immunity act' 99
creates no new duties; it only articulates the common law duty to
maintain roadways in a reasonably safe condition.
F.

Scope of Employment

In Bates v. Doria,200 the plaintiff was raped by an off duty
deputy sheriff. The court affirmed the dismissal of the cause of
action because, as a matter of law, the defendant's actions were so
outrageous as to be outside the scope of his employment. The court
also held that the motion to dismiss the cause of action for negligent
hiring was properly granted because, as a matter of law, there was
no proximate cause between the hiring and the injury: the defendant
was not on duty at the time of the rape, he was not using departmental weapons or wearing his uniform, and he was not conducting
any sheriff's duties.
In Wolf v. Liberis,20 ' the court held that even though police
officers are on duty at all times, the city can only be liable for
actions that fall within the scope of their employment. The mere fact
that the officer told bystanders that he was on duty, did not render
his actions within the scope of his employment.
V.

EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE

There were a substantial number of appellate court decisions
this year on the subject of wrongful discharge. Most of them involved

197.
198.
199.

Id. at 866, 503 N.E.2d at 1057.
150 Il. App. 3d 988, 502 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1986).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
3-103a (1985).
200. 150 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 502 N.E.2d 454 (2d Dist. 1986).
201.
153 I1. App. 3d 488, 505 N.E.2d 1202 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 115 Ill. 2d 552,
511 N.E.2d 438 (1987).
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termination of police officers and firefighters. These were primarily
factual issues reviewed under the "against the manifest weight of the
evidence" standard. The other two cases involved political firing and
retaliatory discharge.
A.

PoliticalFiring

In Worthen v. Secretary of State,20 all employees within the
Auto Dealer Services Division of the Secretary of State's Office were
laid off when the division was closed. These employees primarily
distributed plates and forms, fielded procedural questions, and conducted informational or public relations seminars within their regions.
Just prior to this layoff, several new employees were hired as financial
institutions field representatives. These representatives' primary duties
were to audit; however, there was an issue as to whether the new
employees performed some of the same duties as the discharged
employees. The new hirees were all Republicans although the trial
court refused to admit this evidence. None of those laid off were
allowed to apply for the new positions. Pursuant to office policy,
those laid off were placed on the re-employment list for similar jobs
in their department in their county of residence for the next year.
The hearing officer and the State of Illinois Merit Commission agreed
that the layoffs were proper, and that while the discharged employees
should have been put on the re-employment list for all counties that
they had previously served instead of just their residence county,
they were not entitled to reinstatement.
On review, the appellate court focused on the time frame of the
layoffs as compared to that of the creation of the new positions.
The auditing positions were created and the training of the employees
occurred between August and October of 1984. The evaluation of
the effectiveness of the Auto Dealership division and the subsequent
layoffs occurred during approximately the same time period. The
court noted that the timing was suspect. The court said that there
should have been greater inquiry into the time frame, and the
plaintiffs should have been allowed to introduce evidence of party
affiliation. 20 3 The court remanded the case for further proceedings.

202. 160 I11. App. 3d 325, 513 N.E.2d 475 (4th Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 118 II1. 2d
552, 520 N.E.2d 394 (1988).
203. The reviewing court did not disagree with the finding that the employees performed
different duties; however, the court noted that the new jobs were not that difficult and that
training was provided.
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The court noted that on remand, the employees will still bear
the burden of proving bad faith. Proof of political motivation alone
will not constitute bad faith. Moreover, the Secretary of State had
complied with all the procedural requirements for a layoff except the
employees' annual performance records; however, since the whole
department was laid off, that deficiency will not necessarily invalidate
the layoff. Finally, even if the trial court determined on remand that
money was not saved by the reorganization, increasing efficiency is
also a sufficient reason for the decision. The court did not discuss
the reemployment lists in detail but noted that they should be
reconsidered on remand as part of the package along with the timing
issues.
B.

Retaliatory Discharge

In Carter v. City of Elmwood, Peoria County, 2°4 the plaintiff's
25
complaint for retaliatory discharge was dismissed by the trial court.
The city council by ordinance had eliminated one of two full time
police officer positions three months after plaintiff had complained
that the other officer, the chief, had violated the law. The Third
District held that section 2-205 of the Tort Immunity Act 2°6 protected
the mayor and council members from suit. The court also held that
there is no exception for willful and wanton misconduct. The court
reasoned that the words "willful and wanton" do not appear in the
statute; if the legislature wanted to include that exception, it could
have added that language as it did in other sections of the same act.
The court noted that the retaliatory discharge case, Palmateer v.
InternationalHarvester Co.,207 was inapplicable because the plaintiff
was incapable of crossing the threshold question of immunity.
C. Standard of Review for Discharge Decisions
The standard for reviewing the findings of fact under the Administrative Procedures Act is whether the decision of the review

204. 162 I11.App. 3d 235, 515 N.E.2d 415 (3d Dist. 1987).
205. Id. Plaintiff's complaint contained a second count for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This count was not dismissed by the trial court. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
304(a), plaintiffs were allowed to appeal the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge complaint
even though the section 1983 claim was still pending.
206. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, 2-205 (1985) provides: "A public employee is not liable for
an injury caused by his adoption of, or failure to adopy, an enactment, or by his failure to
enforce any law."
207. 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
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board is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 0 It is for the
board to consider conflicting testimony and the credibility of wit-

nesses .209
The courts generally uphold the boards' determination of facts;
the courts' review is generally limited to whether the sanction was
appropriate. The standard for reviewing the discipline imposed is
whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary or unrelated to the requirements
of the department. 210 A finding that a government employee violated
2'1
department rules, standing alone, is not sufficient for dismissal.

In Burgett v. Collinsville Board of Fire and Police Commissionthe appellate court affirmed the board's finding that Burgett
was outside the city limits and failed to patrol for almost 3 hours.
However, the court reversed on the question of discipline because
the officer's conduct, although improper, was so trivial that it did
not warrant the ultimate sanction of discharge.
In Sheehan v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the
City of Des Plaines,2 3 the court held that the board's decision was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the officer
never adequately explained documentary evidence such as time sheets
and payroll checks that indicated that he was being paid for two off
duty jobs at the same time. The court also held that the sanction of
discharge was fully warranted by the officer's continuous pattern
and practice of deceiving the two off duty employers.
In Martin v. Matthys,2 4 the First District affirmed the dismissal
of an officer who had accepted security work outside the village in
violation of a rule and several direct orders because the officer's
deliberate and continuing disobedience undermined the authority and
weakened the entire structure of the police department. Similarly,
the Fourth District 215 affirmed the commission's decision suspending
a Department of Revenue employee who was late in filing his

ers, 212

208. See Burgett v. Collinsville Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs., 149 Ill. App. 3d 420, 500
N.E.2d 951 (5th Dist. 1986).
209. See Sier v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs. of the City of Peoria, 157 Il. App. 3d
1097, 510 N.E.2d 633 (3d Dist. 1987).
210. See Martin v. Matthys, 149 Ill. App. 3d 800, 501 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist. 1986).
211. Id.
212. 149 Il. App. 3d 421, 500 N.E.2d 951 (5th Dist. 1986).
213. 158 Ill. App. 3d 275, 509 N.E.2d 467 (1st Dist. 1987).
214. 149 Ill. App. 3d 800, 501 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist. 1986).
215. See Department of Revenue v. Smith, 150 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 501 N.E.2d 1370 (4th
Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 726 (1987).
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returns" 6 for two years and used a tax amnesty program to avoid
sanctions2" 7 because his actions affected the effectiveness of the
agency.
The courts have also consistently held that boards need not
conform to strict evidentiary rules. In Schlobohm v. Rice,2 18 a police
officer's urine test indicated the presence of cocaine. The First District
held that a discharge hearing is not a criminal case; therefore, notice
need not conform to the requirements for an indictment, and the
standard of review is manifestly erroneous, not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The First District in Sheehan v. Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners of the City of Des Plaines,2 9 also refused to require
the same evidentiary and procedural limitations to a discharge proceeding that are required in criminal actions. The court held that no
prejudice was shown by the failure of the board to adopt comprehensive rules on the conduct of the hearing because the officer
received a fair and impartial hearing. Counsel for the board, who
did not act as prosecutor, ruled on many evidentiary issues and
motions even though the board retained the authority to overrule
him. Since a review of the proceedings indicated that he acted in a
fair and impartial manner, the court did not disprove this procedure.
A probationary officer has no right to a hearing or to seek
review of his discharge. 20 However, a city, by rule, can provide a
probationary police officer with more protection than state law. 22 1 In
Lewis v. Hayes,22 2 the City of Bradley specifically provided that there
must be cause and a hearing before dismissal of even a probationary
officer. Therefore, plaintiff had a protectable property interest in
employment as a probationary police officer. The officer had been
told at the time he took the exam that although residency was a
requirement, he would have 90 days to comply. 223 However, when

216. Id. He was in the middle of a divorce and the information contained in the returns
could have affected the property distribution.
217. Id. The court held that filing under the tax amnesty program did not protect him
from administrative sanctions because he was disciplined for violating department rules, not
for a statutory violation.
218. 157 I11.App. 3d 90, 510 N.E.2d 43 (lst Dist. 1987).
219. 158 I11.App. 3d 275, 509 N.E.2d 467 (lst Dist. 1987).
220. See Potratz v. State Dep't of Law Enforcement, 154 111.App. 3d 682, 506 N.E.2d
1050 (4th Dist. 1987).
221. See Lewis v. Hayes, 152 Il1. App. 3d 1020, 505 N.E.2d 408 (3d Dist. 1987).
222. 152 I11.App. 3d 1020, 505 N.E.2d 408 (3d Dist. 1987).
223. Id. The only other non resident hired by the department had been given 90 days to
establish residency.
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his name reached the top of the hiring list, they refused to hire him
because he was not a resident and refused to give him the 90 days
to comply with the requirement. Since there was no rational connection between the facts considered and the decision made, the board
224
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to hire him.
On review, the board attempted to justify its decision on grounds
other than that given to the officer at the time he was not hired.
The plaintiff, in response to the question on his application, "Were
you ever discharged or forced to resign because of misconduct or
unsatisfactory service or while under investigation?" had answered
"no, voluntarily resigned." In fact his previous employer had given
him the choice of resigning or having charges filed against him. The
court did not decide the semantic question of whether this constituted
a misrepresentation; however, it did hold that the city should have
been given the opportunity to present evidence of the underlying
misconduct as an affirmative defense.
Finally, in cases from the First and Third Districts, the appellate
court issued conflicting decisions on the interpretation of the statutory
provision on the length of suspensions. 225 In Sheehan v. Board of
Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Des Plaines, 26 the
First District upheld the officer's suspension for more than 30 days
during the pendancy of the hearing. 227 However, only a month later,
in Sier v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of
Peoria,22 the Third District held that, by agreeing to continuances,
a suspended officer does not waive the 30 day limitation on prehearing suspensions. The court noted that allowing a board to impose
multiple 30 day suspensions would render the statutory 30 day

224.

Id. Therefore, the plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

225.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,

10-2.1-17 (1985) provides:

The board of fire and police commissioners shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing
of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of filing thereof, which hearing
may be continued from time to time. In case an officer or member is found guilty,
the board may discharge him, or may suspend him not exceeding 30 days without
pay. The board may suspend any officer or member pending the hearing with or
without pay, but not to exceed 30 days.
226. 158 I1. App. 3d 275, 509 N.E.2d 467 (1st Dist. 1987).
227. Id. The court relied on McCoy v. Kamradt, 136 Ill. App. 3d 551, 483 N.E.2d 544
(1st Dist. 1985).
228. 157 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 510 N.E.2d 633 (3d Dist. 1987). A police officer was suspended
for dropping and striking an unconscious prisoner and filing a false report about the incident.
On another issue the court held that because this issue was merely one of conflicting testimony
and credibility of witnesses, and because it was not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, the administrative determination should be sustained.

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1083 1987-1988

1084

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

limitation meaningless. The Third District did not mention Sheehan
229
in its decision.

229.

Id. The Third District also did not discuss McCoy. See supra note 228.
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